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Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky

Of Property and Federalism
abstract. This Essay proposes a mechanism for expanding competition in state property
law, while sketching out the limitations necessary to protect third parties. The fact that property
law is produced by the states creates a unique opportunity for experimentation with such
property and property-related topics as same-sex marriages, community property, adverse
possession, and easements. The Essay begins by demonstrating the salutary effects of federalism
on the evolution of property law. Specifically, it shows that competition among states has created
a dynamic property system in which new property institutions replace obsolete ones. The Essay
then contemplates the possibility of increasing innovation and individual choice in property law
by inducing state competition over property regimes. Drawing on the scholarly literature
examining state competition for corporate law and competition over the provision of local public
goods, the Essay constructs an open property system that creates an adequate incentive for the
states to offer new property regimes and allows individuals to adopt them without relocating to
the offering state. This Essay also has important implications for the burgeoning literature on
the numerus clausus principle, under which the list of legally permissible property regimes is
closed. The Essay argues that in a federal system, it is socially desirable to expand the list of
property forms to include certain out-of-state forms.
authors. Abraham Bell is Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law;
Lecturer, Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law. Gideon Parchomovsky is Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar-Ilan University, Faculty of Law.
This Essay greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Ian Ayres, William Fischel, Assaf
Hamdani, Kim Roosevelt, Peter Siegelman, and Rob Sitkoff, and from research assistance
provided by Alex Kreit, Sean McEldowney, and Kara Siegel.
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introduction
Property law in the United States is largely the domain of the states, not the
federal government.1 This seemingly unremarkable fact has profound
implications for the structure and substance of property law and policy. The
existence of multiple jurisdictions creates a potential for competition over
property forms. Competition over property forms, in turn, leads to innovation
in property doctrine. Examples are legion. In the area of marital property, for
example, New York recognizes professional degrees as marital property,2
California and eight other states subject assets accumulated during marriage to
a community-property regime,3 and Massachusetts has recently announced
that same-sex marriages must be recognized under its state constitution,
effectively granting married same-sex couples the same property rights as all
other married couples.4 Examples can be found outside of the realm of marital
property as well. Artists in California enjoy droit de suite—a continuing
property right over fine art whose title they have surrendered to others.5 And
many states have recognized the validity of conservation easements for
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

74

See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (recognizing “state law as the traditional source of . . . real property interests”).
Federal property law is traditionally limited to the regulation of properties owned by the
United States and intellectual property law—subjects specifically placed under congressional
jurisdiction by the U.S. Constitution. The Property Clause of the Constitution grants the
national government authority to regulate properties it owns. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2
(“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”). The
Constitution also empowers the national government to exercise authority over federal
enclaves within states. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress the power to “exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over . . . the Seat of the Government . . . and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings”). Additionally, the Patents and Copyrights Clause gives
Congress the power to establish and regulate intellectual property rights. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(granting Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”). While both the Takings Clause and the Federal Due Process
Clause limit national powers to regulate property, they have the effect of making many
kinds of property issues an amalgam of state and federal law. Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 942-99 (2000); see also Stewart E.
Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004).
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES, at xxvii (6th ed. 2004); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 124 n.229 (2004).
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
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environmental protection, in spite of the common law rule that no
nontraditional types of easements may be recognized.6 American property law
may, therefore, be viewed as a giant laboratory in which states vie to develop
the most efficient property regime.7 Although the effects of state competition
have been closely scrutinized by scholars in other legal fields—most notably
corporate law8—the impact on property law has been largely neglected.9
The importance of federalism in property law is highlighted by the recent
scholarly movement to embrace the numerus clausus principle as a defining
feature of the field.10 The numerus clausus principle, as familiarly enunciated by
Bernard Rudden, holds that the law of property “lays down a restricted list of
entitlements which it will permit to count as property interests, or ‘real rights’.
Anything else sounds only, if at all, in contract.”11 Thus, for example, AngloAmerican law recognizes only four types of present possessory estates in land:
fee simple, fee tail, life estate, and leasehold.12 Any attempt to create a new type
of estate will be rejected by the courts.13 Yet, as we will argue, the numerus

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

See Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in
PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 26, 27-31
(Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000) (explaining the variety of
conservation statutes among the states, some based directly on the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act, others bearing little resemblance to that Act).
Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
See infra Section II.A.
Stewart Sterk has done a great deal of work addressing the role of state competition and
federalism in the development of several discrete areas of property law. See, e.g., Stewart E.
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035
(2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts]; Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1992); Sterk, supra
note 1; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:
R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003).
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1669, 1730-39 (2003).
Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239, 239 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 3d ser. 1987).
These estates may be found in their absolute forms, or as defeasible estates, such as life
estate determinable or fee simple subject to condition subsequent. See Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 12-13 (2000).
See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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clausus description of property law as limited to this short menu is only partly
accurate, because menus differ from state to state.
Interstate competition in property law may be characterized by two poles.
In most cases, the menu of available property forms is determined by the situs
of the property. Consequently, if an individual wants to benefit from a
property form not offered on the local menu of forms, she must incur the cost
of relocating to another state. If the relevant asset is realty, changing situs may
be impossible altogether. At this extreme, then, the numerus clausus description
of property law is quite accurate.
At the other extreme, however, property owners can reach beyond the
limits of the local menu and take advantage of the national menu. Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, an act establishing
property status must generally be respected in all states. Thus, when one state
adopts a lax form of divorce or recognizes same-sex marriage, states must
generally recognize this status as one giving rise to the ordinary property forms
attending marriage or its dissolution.14 As Nevada’s divorce law has
demonstrated,15 it is relatively cheap for parties to take advantage of out-ofstate status opportunities and thereby import out-of-state law to expand the
list of available property forms beyond those offered on the local menu. At this
extreme, then, the numerus clausus description of property law is incomplete.16
Federalism allows owners to reach beyond a short menu of forms, making
the number of property forms variable over time and between states. The
importance of federalism in fostering dynamism and choice can be seen
throughout the law of property. Consider again laws related to spousal and
joint property rights. Some states provide for the creation of “community

14.

15.
16.

76

See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (requiring North Carolina to
recognize a divorce issued by a Nevada court). But see Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”). As we discuss
below, there are important limitations on the requirement that states grant full faith and
credit to one another’s acts. See infra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
See infra note 76 (discussing some consequences of Nevada’s liberal divorce law).
States may take action to prevent nonresidents from enjoying the benefits of local law or
residents from taking advantage of foreign law. Massachusetts, for example, bars out-ofstate couples from getting married if the marriage would be illegal in their state of residence.
This law would prevent nonresident same-sex couples from marrying in Massachusetts.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 1998). Likewise, Massachusetts law invalidates
marriages contracted by Massachusetts residents in out-of-state jurisdictions if the marriage
would have been illegal under Massachusetts law. Id. § 10.
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property” between spouses;17 others restrict spousal rights to individually
owned property or the traditional cotenancies (joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, and tenancy by the entirety).18 Some states have abolished tenancies
by the entirety (a form of joint tenancy available only to married couples);19
others have simply altered the rules governing such tenancies.20 Some states
allow unilateral conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common;21
others do not.22 Some states allow spousal rights to be claimed by same-sex
couples;23 others do not.24 These conflicting state rules do not stay meekly in
place. According to statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau, 43.4 million
Americans changed their place of residence between March 1999 and March
2000, 19.4 million of whom moved to new states.25 As couples move across

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

22.
23.

24.

25.

See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 382 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that
community-property systems exist in Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.14-.16, at 232-44 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the history and
nature of community property systems).
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 383-419 (discussing the common law marital
property system).
See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.01[3], at 52-4 to -12 (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., 2001) (discussing each state’s approach to tenancy by the entirety); Colleen
M. Feeney, Note, Lien on Me: After Craft, a Federal Tax Lien Can Attach to Tenancy-by-theEntirety Property, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 245, 255 n.78 (2002) (listing and discussing states in
which, as of 2002, tenancy by the entirety has either been abolished or never existed:
California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin).
See 7 POWELL, supra note 19.
See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 17, § 5.4, at 199-200 (noting the general rule that a joint
tenant can unilaterally sever a joint tenancy by transferring his interest to a third party,
thereby converting the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common).
See, e.g., Spitz v. Rapport, 604 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a joint tenant
may not unilaterally terminate the survivorship rights of another joint tenant).
For example, Vermont recognizes the rights of same-sex couples to enter into a “civil
union.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002) (providing that parties to a civil union “shall
have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage”); cf. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires legal
recognition of same-sex marriages).
See Jes Kraus, Note, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the Need for
Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REV. 959, 977 (2002) (“[M]ost
states and countries still do not offer any benefits to same-sex couples . . . .”).
See JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-538, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20538.pdf.
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state lines, states must adopt rules for dealing with the newly introduced
property forms.26 Some states look to the situs of the property,27 others look to
the place of the property right’s creation,28 and yet others create hybrid rules to
compromise between the conflicting property regimes, essentially creating new
forms of property.29
However, competition under the existing federal system is limited. When
creating new property rights, owners may not choose willy-nilly from the
competing property regimes now in force throughout the United States.
Because real property is both immobile and subject to situs rules, it is excluded
from at least some of the salutary effects of federalism. Even when personalty is
at issue and, therefore, the owner can avoid situs rules, choice-of-law rules will
often require that the asset be physically present to some degree in the relevant
jurisdiction for the asset to be governed by the jurisdiction’s rule.
This artificial geographic limitation on an owner’s choice creates an
unnecessary obstacle to interstate competition in property forms and the
innovation that can result. To see why, consider the effects of federalism on
contract law. Individuals may adopt any arrangement they want simply by
inserting a choice-of-law clause in the contract. No similar option is available
in property law. One may not, for example, create a chattel in California, but
specify that it will be governed by the property law of Wyoming. To enjoy the
full benefits of federalism, the owner must make sure that the chattel satisfies
the relevant situs rules by relocating the chattel to Wyoming at creation.
This Essay proposes a way to change the existing state of affairs. It outlines
a new legal mechanism that would increase states’ incentives to create new
property forms while allowing owners to take advantage of those forms
without relocating. We posit that under certain plausible conditions our
mechanism will lead to a “race to the top” in property law. Our starting
assumption is that the interstate competition made possible by the federal
structure is highly desirable. First and foremost, competition expands the
menu of available property regimes, providing citizens with greater choice. A
26.

27.

28.

29.

78

For instance, when a married couple owns a car as community property, and then moves to
a state that does not recognize that property form, the target state must have a rule for
coping with the unrecognized form. See infra Subsection I.A.3.
See, e.g., Robby Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 585, 585 (1987) (“Courts continue to reach choice-of-law decisions for real property
disputes by mechanically applying the situs rule, giving little consideration to concepts of
fairness and justice.”).
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 425 (explaining that in the case of migrating
couples, “[o]nce the property has been initially characterized, the ownership does not
change when the parties change their domicile unless both parties consent to the change in
ownership” (emphasis omitted)).
See infra note 167.
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richer menu of property rules gives individuals a greater chance of finding the
most suitable property regime for them. Second, competition creates a fertile
ground for experimentation with new property forms and proliferation of these
forms as states adopt laws that have proven useful in other states. Third, more
localized control of property forms, particularly those regarding realty,
produces property law at a level of government to which property owners are
more likely to pay close attention, resulting in better matches between the rules
adopted and the affected citizens’ welfare preferences.30
However, in enlarging the menu of property forms to enhance the
beneficial effects of federalism, we must take account of the complications
arising from three interlocking elements. First, in order for state legislatures to
capture the full value of innovative property forms, they should be able to
collect payment from out-of-state property owners who wish to adopt them.
Because innovative forms have some characteristics of public goods, other
states may be able to free-ride on these innovations. If state legislatures are
unable to collect such payments, they may have an insufficient incentive to
come up with new property forms, and competition will be diminished.
Second, a completely open federal market for property forms would suffer
from a peculiar imbalance: It would entitle one to establish property forms in
the entire United States by winning the political debate in a single jurisdiction.
By contrast, to block a property form, one would have to win the debate in all
jurisdictions. Third, and finally, legislation results not simply from the wellintentioned decisions of local policymakers or from local budgetary concerns.
The political landscape is also influenced by campaign contributions and other
factors related to the personal interests of the policymakers. Our proposal takes
account of all three complications.31
Our Essay relies on two important reference points. The first is the Tiebout
hypothesis, which predicts that competition among localities will result in a
variety of communities with different amenities, and citizens will select the
community that fits their preference best by voting with their feet.32 The
second is the burgeoning literature on whether state competition in corporate
law leads to a race to the bottom or a race to the top.33 However, in the

30.

31.
32.

33.

As William Fischel has noted, the regulation of property taxes at the local level renders
homeowners particularly attuned to local politics. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4-5 (2001).
See infra Part III.
In addition, we note Albert Hirschman’s terminology distinguishing between control
through exit and voice. In the context of this Essay, we treat Hirschman’s work as an
important extension of Tiebout’s theory. See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section II.A.
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property context, there is no one dominant state à la Delaware34 and the
potential for interstate competition is much greater. Each of these literatures
provides a rich background for analyzing the importance of interjurisdictional
competition in producing efficient law.
By casting a fresh eye on federalism’s effect on property, our Essay
produces two central insights. The first is theoretical: We show that the
current restrictive interpretation of property law is choice-constraining and,
thus, welfare-diminishing. The second is normative: We make a case for
greater autonomy for owners in selecting the property regime that will apply to
their assets. Specifically, we propose adopting a flexible version of the numerus
clausus principle, one that allows owners to go beyond the menu of property
forms offered in their jurisdiction and to import forms from other states that
better fit their needs. To avoid a race to the bottom, we suggest that owners
must register their use of an out-of-state property form.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we discuss the movement to
characterize property as embodying a principle of “optimal standardization,”
and demonstrate why this movement is inherently in tension with the federal
structure of American property law. In Part II, we connect this observation
with the ever-burgeoning literature on the importance of state competition in
the development of efficient legal constructs. In particular, we translate some of
the findings in the scholarship on corporate law and the Tiebout hypothesis
into the property context. In Part III, we make the normative case for
enhancing interstate competition and owner autonomy in property law and
introduce an innovative proposal capable of achieving these goals.
i. standardization and change in the law of property
An accepted part of the property canon in common and civil law systems,
the numerus clausus principle received scant attention in the United States for
most of the nation’s history. In fact, until recently no one even bothered to give
the principle an English name.35 The fortunes of numerus clausus were reversed
only in 2000, when Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argued that numerus
clausus was a central organizing principle of the law of property.36 Expounding

34.

35.

36.

80

The official website of the State of Delaware states that “[m]ore than half a million business
entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publiclytraded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500.” State of Delaware, Division of
Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 4 (“In the common law, the principle that property
rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which
recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus—the number is closed.”).
Id.
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on Rudden’s description of numerus clausus as forcing a “restricted list of
entitlements which . . . count as property interests,”37 Merrill and Smith
developed a theory that positioned the principle at the center of property
theory. As its name—closed enumeration—suggests, the numerus clausus
principle closes the list of property forms such that any attempt by private
parties to create a new form of property succeeds only in creating contractual
rights enforceable between those parties. The numerus clausus principle
therefore establishes a sharp line between contract and property law. Parties to
a contract can create any contractual rights they want, so long as basic
ingredients such as promise, acceptance, and consideration are present. By
contrast, parties cannot create a new type of property right, but rather must fit
a property conveyance into a type already recognized by law.38 Accordingly, a
lease “for the duration of the war” does not create a leasehold of such duration;
the leasehold will instead be interpreted as being either a term of years39 or a
tenancy at will.40
Merrill and Smith argued that the principle of numerus clausus is central to
American property law. Noting that property rights are in rem and avail
against the rest of the world rather than merely those who are parties to an
agreement, Merrill and Smith tied the numerus clausus principle to a broader
information-based analysis of property law. They argued that because each
additional property form increases the burden on third parties of obtaining
information about the nature of property rights, limiting the list of property
forms keeps the information costs of property law in check. Thus, where
Rudden saw no connection between the numerus clausus principle and any
economic theory, Merrill and Smith seemingly reconciled the two within the
information-oriented framework. In the aftermath of the Merrill and Smith
article, there has been an outpouring of articles celebrating the numerus clausus
principle, on both efficiency and non-efficiency grounds.41
37.
38.

39.

40.

41.

Rudden, supra note 11.
Merrill and Smith acknowledged that in some cases parties could utilize existing property
forms in creative ways in order to achieve functionally new forms. For example, the
intended lease “for the duration of the war” could be restructured as a conveyance of a
determinable estate. Merrill and Smith assert that the costliness of this legal creativity can be
viewed as a “pollution tax” that deters the creation of functionally new forms. See Merrill &
Smith, supra note 12, at 35.
See, e.g., Smith’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1946) (holding
that a lease running until the end of World War II was to be treated as a term-of-years
tenancy).
See, e.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding that a
lease until sixty days after the end of World War II was to be treated as a tenancy at will);
Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22, 24-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944) (ruling that a lease “for the
duration of the war” was a tenancy at will).
See supra note 10.
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As we show in this Part, the emerging conventional wisdom about the
desirability of the numerus clausus principle suffers from at least one important
flaw: It fails to capture American property law’s federal structure.42 Indeed, the
fact that property forms differ across jurisdictions ensures that the “closed” list
of property forms in any given jurisdiction is in a constant state of flux and
development.43
To highlight the importance of federalism, we will examine some of the
many property doctrines that have been fundamentally altered by it.
Specifically, we examine several menus of property forms—cotenancies,
easements, and continuing intellectual property rights (for example, droit de
suite)—whose diversity is enhanced by the variety of options offered by
different states.
At the outset, we stress that this survey is far from complete. Besides the
doctrines specifically mentioned here, many other property rules have been
caught up in the maelstrom of federal competition. For instance, as Robert
Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach demonstrate, competition for trust funds,
driven by changes in the tax code, has led states to revamp their approach to
the Rule Against Perpetuities.44
A. Cotenancies
Common law recognized three main types of concurrent ownership
interests: joint tenancies, tenancies in common, and tenancies by the entirety.45
A joint tenancy is characterized by joint ownership in the asset as a whole with

42.

Other aspects of property are also difficult to reconcile with the information-based thesis
propounded by Merrill and Smith. Their theory is predicated on an incomplete analysis of
the nature of property rights and their costs and benefits. While information costs certainly
play a role in shaping property law, they hardly exhaust the cost-benefit calculus involved in
determining the efficacy of property rules. We address this issue at greater length in
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005).

43.

To be sure, Merrill and Smith considered “idiosyncratic property rights” to be the bane of
their approach, and nothing in the federal structure allows such personalized rights. See
Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-34. Nonetheless, the availability of a wide variety of
available property forms across jurisdictions belies the strict numerus clausus approach.
See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 339. Dukeminier and Krier noted that coparceny,
also recognized at common law, was “early eliminated” from the American colonies. Id. at
339 n.2. Similar to a tenancy in common and contemporaneous with primogeniture,
coparceny described the cotenancy held by the daughters of a decedent lacking a male heir.
Dukeminier and Krier also noted that a handful of other types of concurrent tenancies were
known at common law. Id. at 339.

44.
45.

82

BELL PARCH OCT 19 NO HEADER

11/1/2005 5:12:48 PM

of property and federalism

a right of survivorship.46 Traditionally, a joint tenancy required the presence of
four unities: unity of title, unity of time, unity of possession, and unity of
interest.47 Tenancies in common, by contrast, never required the four unities.
They differ in effect from joint tenancies primarily in that they do not create a
right of survivorship.48 Tenancies by the entirety, the third option, are very
similar to joint tenancies. Like joint tenancies, they require the presence of the
four unities, and are accompanied by a right of survivorship. However,
tenancies by the entirety differ in two important respects. First, they may only
be adopted by married couples, meaning that they require a fifth unity—the
unity of marriage. Second, tenants by the entirety wishing to transfer their
property interest must generally secure their cotenant’s permission to do so.49
While these three property forms may appear to exhaust the menu of
available cotenancies, in fact, potential cotenants have a plethora of options,
thanks to differences among the states.
1. Tenancy by the Entirety
Tenancy by the entirety has fallen into disfavor in recent decades, leading
to a remarkable diversity of approaches to such tenancies in the United States.
Many states have abolished tenancies by the entirety altogether.50 In states that
have retained this regime, a wide variety of rules has emerged regarding the

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.

Id. at 340.
Blackstone formulated the doctrine thus:
The properties of a joint estate are derived from it’s unity, which is fourfold; the
unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity of possession: or,
in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and
the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and
the same undivided possession.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *180.
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 340.
See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1530 (2003) (noting that most
jurisdictions “require[] a joint act by both spouses so that only the marital unit, as opposed
to any individual spouse, has the right of control” over property held by the entirety).
7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 52.03[3], at 52-22 to -24 (noting that tenancy by the entirety has
been abolished in California, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 384 (discussing the Married Women’s Property Acts,
which “removed the disabilities of coverture and gave a married woman, like a single
woman, control over all her property as separate and immune from her husband’s debts”);
Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Ownership for
Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423 (2001) (discussing the historical bases and
evolution of cotenancies).
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effect of purported unilateral transfers.51 One group of states allows unilateral
transfers, so long as the property interest remains subject to a right of
survivorship,52 another prohibits all unilateral transfers,53 and a third group
bars creditors from levying on the debtor-spouse’s right of possession but
permits them to levy on the debtor-spouse’s right of survivorship.54 States are
also divided as to the types of assets that may be held in tenancy by the
entirety, with most, but not all, permitting only interests in land to be so
held.55
2. Joint Tenancies
As we noted above, common law recognized a joint tenancy only when the
four unities were present. However, many states have recently recognized joint
tenancies even when one of the unities is missing. Thus, the law of various
jurisdictions reveals a considerable disagreement as to whether a joint tenancy
survives a joint tenant’s fictional “conveyance” to herself. California, for
example, permits a joint tenant to terminate a joint tenancy—and extinguish

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.
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See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977) (discussing the effect of unilateral transfers
on tenancy by the entirety in various jurisdictions); see also Dagan, supra note 49, at 1529-30
(“Contemporary law is divided on the question of whether one spouse can transfer his or
her interest in the entireties property during marriage, as well as on the corresponding
power of that spouse’s creditors to subject the debtor-spouse’s interest in the entireties
estate to creditors’ claims.”).
See, e.g., Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1993) (interpreting
a statute equalizing rights of spouses in entireties and holding that one spouse may
mortgage his or her interest in such property without the other spouse’s consent, subject to
the other spouse’s survivorship right).
See, e.g., Estate of Lampert v. Estate of Lampert, 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995) (applying
Hawaii law); Sawada, 561 P.2d at 1295; Arbesman v. Winer, 468 A.2d 633, 638 (Md. 1983)
(holding that neither spouse can make an effective lease without joinder of the other); Elko
v. Elko, 49 A.2d 441 (Md. 1946).
See, e.g., King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959) (holding that a creditor’s interest attaches
to the debtor-spouse’s interest after the death of the other spouse); Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351
A.2d 236, 245 (Pa. 1976) (holding that only the survivorship right can be unilaterally
transferred, or seized by creditors). Additionally, a de facto federal law of tenancies by the
entirety permits forfeiture of rights of survivorship, but not of current possession. United
States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 949 F.2d 73, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991).
John V. Orth notes that an “exception to the rule of no holding of personalty in tenancy by
the entirety is recognized in cases in which realty held in that estate is converted into its
money value without the consent of both owners. The usual case of ‘involuntary conversion’
occurs when real property is taken by condemnation.” John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety:
The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 47 n.60 (citing
Ronan v. Ronan, 159 N.E.2d 653 (Mass. 1959)).
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the other joint tenant’s right of survivorship—by self-conveyance.56 By
contrast, until 2004 Nebraska held to the traditional common law rule that
requires a real conveyance—i.e., a transfer to a third party—in order to break
the unities of time and title, and thereby terminate a joint tenancy.57 New York,
taking a middle position, allows a self-conveyance to sever a joint tenancy, but
only if the conveyance is properly recorded so as to impart notice to the other
cotenant.58 A similar split of authority can be found on the effects of divorce,59
and executions of mortgages60 or leaseholds,61 on the continued existence of a
joint tenancy.62
As we discuss later in this Part, joint tenancy underwent an even more
thorough reform in the twentieth century, as many states sought to abolish the
right of survivorship by statute. Ultimately, however, these states revived the
right of survivorship in joint tenancies.63

56.

57.

58.

59.

CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 683.2 (West Supp. 2005); Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534
(Ct. App. 1980); see also Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 432 N.E.2d 386, 387 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Minn.
1968); In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996).
Krause v. Crossley, 277 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Neb. 1979) (“Here the cotenant . . . attempted to
sever the joint tenancy by a deed from himself as grantor to himself as grantee. We now
hold that this act does not constitute a severance of the joint tenancy and that the right of
survivorship at the time of the death of [the cotenant] was in the plaintiff . . . .”); see also R.
H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1213 (1998) (discussing the history of Nebraska’s adherence to traditional rules of joint
tenancy). The Nebraska General Assembly overruled Krause in 2004. See NEB. REV. STAT
§ 76-118 (2004).
See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240-c (McKinney Supp. 2005) (stating that no unilateral
transfer by a joint tenant “shall terminate the right of survivorship of any non-severing joint
tenant or tenants as to the severing tenant’s interest unless the deed or written instrument
effecting the severance is recorded, prior to the death of the severing tenant, in the county
where the real property is located”).
“Some courts have held that a joint tenancy is not automatically extinguished as a result of
the dissolution of the marriage of the joint tenants.” 7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 51.04[3], at

51-23 to -24.
60.

61.

62.
63.

See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208 (Md. 1992) (holding that neither a mortgage
on the property executed by all joint tenants nor an agreement between joint tenants
conferring upon one the exclusive right to receive income from the property will sever the
joint tenancy); Eder v. Rothamel, 95 A.2d 860, 863 (Md. 1953) (holding that conveyance of
a mortgage destroys the unity of title (citing Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 272 N.W. 637
(Wis. 1937))).
See, e.g., Tehnet v. Bosell, 554 P.2d 330, 335 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a lease does not break
the unities); Alexander v. Boyer, 253 A.2d 359, 364 (Md. 1969) (holding that a lease breaks
the unities).
See generally Helmholz, supra note 57.
See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
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3. Community Property
The emergence of community-property regimes in a handful of states has
further expanded the menu of options for concurrent ownership. In
community-property states, spouses interested in co-ownership of property
may reject the traditional common law cotenancies and instead hold assets as
community property. Community property is considered to be owned by the
spouses as a single unit and is therefore subject to joint management.
However, community property does not carry with it a right of survivorship.64
Dissolution of the marriage by divorce terminates the community-property
regime; depending on the state, the community property is then divided
according to the principle of either equal or joint distribution.65
Community-property states also divide on the question of what incoming
property becomes community property or separate property. For instance,
some states, including Idaho66 and Texas,67 assign community-property status
to income from separate property, while others view such income as separate
property.68
The issue of marital property is further complicated by two factors. First,
states are divided on whether marital property regimes are mandatory or
optional. Common law property regimes are generally optional, meaning that
couples may decide in what form to own their property.69 Couples may decide
upon separate ownership of assets, or upon one or another form of joint
tenancy. Community-property regimes, however, are generally mandatory.
Thus, property acquired by one spouse’s earnings automatically becomes
community property.70 Alaska, however, is an elective community-property
state in which couples have the option of holding property as a community or
separately.71 Most states also allow the voluntary transmutation of property

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

86

DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 421.
7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 53.07[1], at 53-100 to -101.
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-906, 32-906A (1996 & Supp. 2005).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.001-.002 (Vernon 1998).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.010-.020 (West 2005).
Wisconsin, for example, provides such an optional community-property scheme. 7 POWELL,
supra note 19, § 53.02[1], at 53-4 to -26.
Community-property states may, however, preserve separate ownership for “property
acquired before marriage and property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent.”
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 420.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (2004). Indeed, Alaska invites nonresidents to opt into Alaska
community-property law by creating an Alaska community-property trust. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 456 (7th ed. 2005).
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forms by agreement, permitting spouses to transform community property to
separate property or vice versa.72
Second, and more confusingly, marital property issues are becoming
increasingly complicated as a result of growing gaps between states concerning
the legal recognition of marital status. Massachusetts has recognized the rights
of same-sex couples to marry,73 while Vermont74 (and perhaps California75) has
granted such couples the right to form civil unions carrying the same legal
status. This would seem to grant same-sex partners the ability to obtain marital
or quasi-marital status in one of these states, and, by extension, the right to
enjoy the property rights attendant to marital status in any state in the
Union.76 However, in 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which granted states the right not to recognize the validity of acts
respecting a same-sex relationship “that is treated as a marriage” or to give
effect to rights and claims “arising from such [a] relationship.”77 While many
scholars have argued that DOMA exceeds congressional power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,78 others have argued for the validity of the Act.79

72.
73.
74.
75.

76.

77.
78.

See 7 POWELL, supra note 19, § 53.03[1][b1], at 53-32.
Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1202, 1204 (2002).
While the California Supreme Court halted same-sex marriages in 2004 in Lockyer v. City
and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004), the court did not rule on the
constitutionality of such marriages.
Such, for example, was the case with Nevada divorce when that state’s liberal rules for
marriage dissolution altered property rights for divorcing couples throughout the Union.
Once couples obtained a Nevada divorce, their home states were required to give “full faith
and credit” to the divorce, leading, for example, to the dissolution of tenancies by the
entirety and other property forms affected by marital status. See NELSON M. BLAKE, THE
ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 181-88 (1962). According to
Blake:
By the 1920’s the Nevada courts were granting about 1,000 divorces a year; after
the residence requirement was reduced to three months, production more than
doubled with over 2,500 divorces in 1928. The effect of the 1931 law reducing
residence to six weeks was equally dramatic. The rate again doubled, and in 1931
there were 5,260 Nevada divorces. Annual production fell off somewhat during
the later years of the Great Depression, but soared wildly under the impact of
World War II, reaching 11,000 in 1943 and 20,500 in 1946. Thereafter, it subsided
to a more or less stable level of between 9,000 and 10,000 a year during the later
1950’s.
Id. at 158-59.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
See, e.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604, 649 (1997); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of
Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REV. 799, 812 (1999); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
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Additionally, some have argued that cases recognizing a “public policy”
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause would allow states to refuse
recognition to foreign same-sex marriages even in the absence of DOMA.80 As
of April 2003, thirty-seven states had enacted laws denying local effect to samesex marriages and civil unions recognized in other states.81 Today, one must
check the chain of marital status as well as the chain of property rights in order
to determine the legal status of property ownership. Thus, for example, a
purchaser of an automobile from one member of a same-sex couple from a
community-property state would have to see if the automobile was purchased
as community property and whether the same-sex couple was entitled at the
time of purchase to the marital rights to create such a property status.
4. The Rise and Fall of Cotenancies
The dynamism in property forms can be seen by examining not only
differences between state policies, but also the development of property forms
over time. The question of whether there is vibrant competition for property
law regimes is an empirical one beyond the scope of this Essay. Nonetheless,

79.

80.

81.

88

Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 974 (1998); Letter from
Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (May 24,
1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S13,359-61 (daily ed. June 6, 1996).
Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of
an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 456 (1998) (arguing for
the validity of DOMA under the “Effect Clause”); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North
Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187,
223 (1998) (same); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 391-92 (1998) (same).
See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827,
888-89 (2004) (“[S]ome advocates and scholars on both sides of the DOMA debate
acknowledged that due to the ‘public policy exception,’ other states with connection to the
parties likely would not have to recognize same-sex marriages from another state.
Opponents of the legislation therefore argued it was unnecessary because the Constitution
itself would not require states to give the same-sex marriages recognition.”). The public
policy exception permits states to refuse to recognize the validity of foreign states’ acts when
such recognition would “involve an improper interference with important interests of the
sister State.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971). Others, however,
argue that the public policy exception is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex
Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965
(1997).
See Leigh Jones, Gay Partner May Pursue Wrongful Death as Spouse, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2003,
at 1 (“[W]hile 37 other states have used the federal law to pass their own laws establishing
that they do not recognize same-sex unions in other jurisdictions, some 13 states, New York
among them, have not codified the apparent power that the Defense of Marriage Act
provides to states.”).
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several episodes in the history of cotenancy law in the United States suggest
that property doctrines at the state level do not stand in place, but rather
change in response to the give and take of politics.
Several states tried to do away with the right of survivorship as a feature of
joint tenancies.82 Among these states were North Carolina in 178483 and
Pennsylvania in 1812.84 Generally, the explanation for the abolition was
straightforward: Given the ability of parties to pass property to one another
through testamentary instruments, there was no need for a special form of
property that would allow a person to take up ownership automatically upon
death of a cotenant.85 Yet, political forces—concerned with the ability to pass
property without probate—inexorably pushed toward the recreation of the
survivorship right.
Thus, for instance, Ohio courts eliminated joint tenancies with
survivorship in the 1826 decision Sergeant v. Steinberger,86 but later recognized
the ability of parties to create an effective “joint and survivorship deed.”87
North Carolina reversed its abolition act in 1991, thereby allowing the creation
of a joint tenancy with survivorship, while preserving an interpretive
presumption against survivorship.88 Pennsylvania reached a similar result by
judicial interpretation of the relevant statute in 1934.89 Tenancies by the
entirety underwent a different reform. At common law, the husband was
entitled to possess, manage, and control the assets during the marriage.90 This

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

90.

See supra text accompanying note 63.
Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI (repealed 1991), reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 574 (Walter Clark ed., 1904).
Act of Mar. 31, 1812, ch. 194, 1812 Pa. Laws 259 (codified at 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 110
(West 2004)).
See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancy Law, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 173 (2002).
2 Ohio 305 (1826).
Curlis v. Pursley, 10 Ohio Misc. 266, 270-71 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1967).
Act of July 12, 1990, ch. 891, § 1, 1990 N.C. Sess. Laws 224 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
41-2 (2004)); see John V. Orth, The Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69
N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991).
In re Lowry’s Estate, 171 A. 878 (Pa. 1934) (holding that while the statute abolished the right
of survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy, it did not prevent the creation of such a right
either by devise or grant in deed). We present no broader theory about the importance of
particular branches of government in the shaping of property. For one interesting
perspective on the struggle between legislature and judiciary, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
See Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: A Solution for Common Law Property
Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 455, 457 (2003) (“[A]t common law husbands were generally the
titleholders or managers of all the marital property since married women were unable to
own or manage property given the disabilities of married women.”); Orth, supra note 55, at
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inequitable feature of the estate, however, was abolished over the course of the
twentieth century.91 Today, tenancy by the entirety, where it exists, provides
for equality between spouses.
B. Easements
While subject to less dramatic changes than the law of cotenancies,
easements have also been subject to a variety of approaches throughout the
United States. Easements are property interests in realty (or personalty)92 that
grant owners use rights but not possessory rights. Traditionally, only a handful
of use rights and restrictions were cognizable at common law as easements.
Outside this list, any agreement between parties regarding the use of assets
would create no property rights. Nevertheless, a number of new easements
have been recognized in various U.S. jurisdictions, as have new means for
creating them.93
Easements may be classified as either affirmative or negative. Affirmative
easements grant the easement-holder the right to use the servient property in a
certain manner—such as the right to cross neighboring property by foot—
while negative easements bar the servient property owner from certain uses—
such as blocking water flow.94 English common law recognized only four types
of negative easements: “[T]he right to stop your neighbor from (1) blocking
your windows, (2) interfering with air flowing to your land in a defined
channel, (3) removing the support of your building (usually by excavating or
removing a supporting wall), and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an
artificial stream.”95 Additionally, negative easements could only be appurtenant
(for the benefit of a property) and not in gross (for the benefit of a person).96

91.

92.
93.

94.
95.
96.

90

42-43 (noting that “[w]ell past the middle of the twentieth century, [tenancy by the
entirety] was still male-dominated in a number of states”).
Orth, supra note 55, at 43 (“[I]n a process not completed until late in the twentieth century,
state after state legislated to equalize the rights of the spouses over property held in the
tenancy by the entirety.”).
See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004).
In addition to the approaches to privately held easements we mention here, there are a
variety of state rules regarding public easements. For instance, in some states, courts are
generous in creating prescriptive public easements, or the equivalent, in order to promote
access to coastal beaches. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches),
649 A.2d 604, 610 (N.H. 1994); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355
(N.J. 1984).
JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND ¶ 2.03,
at 2-14 to -17 (rev. ed. 1998).
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 855 (footnote omitted).
See 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2000).
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American law also traditionally limited the types of negative easements that
could be recognized.97 However, many states have expanded the list beyond
the traditional four. Perhaps the most famous new easement is the
conservation easement, which is essentially a negative easement in gross that
prevents development of land that is harmful to the environment.98 The
purposes of conservation easements include: “retaining or protecting natural,
scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural
resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, [and] preserving the
historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.”99
Under the common law, the conservation easement would be impossible. It
prevents a use beyond the four traditional prohibitions recognized under
English law, and it runs in gross rather than being appurtenant.100 Yet, in the
past fifty years, many states have provided for conservation easements,101
including the eighteen states and the District of Columbia that have adopted
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act.102 In fact, only Wyoming,
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Oklahoma continue to prohibit the form.103
Permissible conservation easements have varied widely among those states that
permit them. For instance, some states’ conservation easements “cover only
land conservation, while others cover both land conservation and historic
preservation.”104
C. Droit de Suite
Copyright law extends the domain of property law to intangible expressive
works. Under the United States Copyright Act, the initial copyright vests in the
author of the work.105 Authors may subsequently assign their rights to others

97.
98.
99.
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 857 (“In the main, American courts accepted the
English restrictions on creating new types of [negative] easements.”).
See Sarah C. Smith, Note, A Public Trust Argument for Public Access to Private Conservation
Land, 52 DUKE L.J. 629, 633 (2002).
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1996).
Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment
on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 381 (2001) (noting that “conservation easements
are an anomaly without precedent in the common law of easements”).
Id. at 384-85 (discussing the legislation of conservation easements by states).
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 384.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
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and, if they do, they are no longer entitled to a share in the profits from the
resale of the work.
However, a minority property doctrine, in force in the state of California,
creates and preserves a continuing property right for the artist who created the
work. This right, known as the droit de suite, is recognized under the California
Resale Royalties Act (CRRA).106 It provides that when a work of fine art—
defined as “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of
art in glass”107—is resold, payment must also be made to the artist (or
successors for twenty years after the artist’s death).108 The artist’s right to a
share in the proceeds of a resale exists notwithstanding the artist’s previous
transfer of all ownership of the artwork that is the subject of the sale. Indeed,
without such a transfer, the CRRA preserves no rights for the artist.109
In order for the CRRA to apply, the seller must be a California resident at
the time of the resale, or the resale must take place within California.110 Artists
may not transfer or waive their right to royalties except by a written contract
“providing for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such
[re]sale.”111
ii. the value of state competition
In this Part, we discuss the utility of interstate competition for property
regimes. Our analysis incorporates two rich literatures: the elaborate body of
work on state competition in corporate law and the scholarship spawned by
Charles Tiebout on competition over the provision of local public goods. In
addition, we examine the mechanisms through which federalism produces
political change, and we tie the scholarship concerning competition to Albert
Hirschman’s analysis of voice and exit as instruments of policy shaping. We
conclude this Part by discussing how our analysis ties into the existing
scholarship on the production of various property forms and rights.

106.

107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
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CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005); cf. Morsenburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d
972 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that § 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act does not preempt the
California legislation because the latter merely provides a supplemental right to the
copyright holders).
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 986(c)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
Id. § 986(a)(7).
Id. § 986(a), (b)(5). The artist’s share on resale is a royalty equal to five percent of the gross
resale price (unless the resale price is under $1,000 or less than the price previously paid by
seller); the duty to pay falls upon the seller or the seller’s agent. Id. § 986(a)(1), (b)(4),
(b)(5).
Id. § 986(a).
Id.
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A. State Competition in Corporate Law
The rich literature on the effects of interstate competition for corporate law
provides a natural starting point for our analysis. This body of scholarship
developed in two stages. The first salvo in the debate was fired by William
Cary, who famously stated that competition among states to attract
corporations generates a “race for the bottom.”112 According to Cary, corporate
managers seek out the regulatory regime most favorable to their schemes at the
expense of the shareholders. Cary’s bleak prediction was inextricably related to
the agency problem that is the underlying concern of much corporate law. The
agency problem arises out of the divergence of interests between the principal
and agent, and posits that one cannot always presume that the agent will serve
the interests of the principal rather than her own. In the corporate context, the
shareholders are the principals and formal owners of the corporation, but they
must entrust the daily operations to an agent, the professional management,
which enjoys effective immunity from shareholder oversight.
Cary’s pessimism was soon countered by a much more optimistic view. In a
famous article, Judge Ralph Winter argued that state competition would
actually lead to a race to the top.113 In Winter’s view, shareholders would invest
only in companies subject to regulatory regimes that curbed managerial excess.
The result, wrote Winter, would be that the need for capital to fund corporate
activities would force managers to incorporate in those states whose legal
regimes reliably overcame the agency problem and protected shareholders.114
Soon, however, the Winter-Cary debate was eclipsed by a more
fundamental question—is there, in fact, any race at all? Michael Klausner
pointed out that Delaware leads the nation in incorporations by a substantial
margin. The dominance of Delaware’s corporate law leads to “network
externalities” that make Delaware a superior choice for a prospective
corporation, irrespective of the attractiveness of its corporate law.115
Subsequently, Ehud Kamar, alone and together with Marcel Kahan, took
112.
113.
114.

115.

William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
705 (1974).
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
Cf. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
709, 732-37 (1987) (reviewing empirical studies of state competition and arguing that “to the
extent they can be used to buttress any position, it is the value-maximizing view associated
with Ralph Winter”).
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757,
844 (1995) (pointing out that “network externalities may have increased the value of the
Delaware charter and created a self-reinforcing dynamic that extended Delaware’s lead”
(footnote omitted)).
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Klausner’s insight a step further by positing that Delaware enjoys a monopoly
position in the market for incorporations, calling into question the ability of
other states to compete with Delaware.116 And, indeed, recent contributions to
the debate support the view that there is no robust competition among states in
this context. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have suggested
that the alleged “race” for incorporations never transpired, and that the process
would be more aptly described as a “leisurely walk.”117
There are three important differences between the corporate context and
the property context. First, much of the controversy about the competition for
efficient corporate law concerns the agency problem. As noted previously, Cary
feared a race to the bottom in which corporate managers would choose
jurisdictions that benefited their interests at the expense of shareholders.118
However, property law typically does not involve such a clash of interests—the
owner seeks to take advantage of favorable laws to enhance the value of her
own assets.
Second, in the property context, no state enjoys Delaware’s dominant
status.119 While New York and California are highly influential, one cannot
summarize the law of property by focusing exclusively on these two states. On
many doctrinal questions, New York and California law are in diametric
opposition. At a risk of mild overstatement, it may be said that New York
property law is somewhat conservative and static, while California’s is marked
by sometimes controversial innovations.120 Moreover, important cases in the
116.

117.

118.
119.

120.
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Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 748 (2002) (concluding that states do not compete over incorporations and that
Delaware enjoys a monopoly status); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (1998) (arguing that
“Delaware has market power that allows it to engage in anticompetitive behavior”).
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553 (2002). However, Melvin
Eisenberg, and later Mark Roe, have pointed out that although Delaware is virtually
immune to competition from other states, it faces potential competition from the federal
government, which may at any time increase its regulatory oversight. Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 (1989) (noting
that potential intervention by the federal government provides a check on Delaware’s ability
to abuse its dominance); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003)
(discussing the possible effects of federal regulations on Delaware law).
See Cary, supra note 112.
According to Sitkoff and Schanzenbach, Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska are the
dominant states in jurisdictional competition over trust law. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach,
supra note 44.
Most notably, New York generally follows the traditional common law rule against
perpetuities, see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 17, at 334, and refuses to impose a duty to
mitigate damages on landlords, see Holy Prop. Ltd. v. Kenneth Cole Prod., 661 N.E.2d 694,
696 (N.Y. 1995).
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property canon come from various jurisdictions in the United States, ranging
from Massachusetts121 and New Jersey122 to Minnesota123 and Oregon.124
Third, there are more significant barriers to creating property rights in
different states than there are to forming corporations. Particularly when realty
is concerned, the choice among property regimes may entail choosing between
highly imperfect substitutes. Real estate in one location is never the precise
equivalent of real estate in another, and the law governing property rights in
such real estate is invariably that of the realty’s situs. Even when chattels are
concerned, creating property rights in another state may involve significant
costs, such as relocating one’s residence. The result is that the gains to be
enjoyed from another state’s property regime must be rather large before it is
cost-effective to take steps to fall under the competitor’s property law.
Although Delaware currently dominates the market for incorporation, it
did not always enjoy this position. Until the end of the nineteenth century,
New Jersey dominated the market. Between 1888 and 1899, forty-two percent
of the companies whose value exceeded one million dollars were chartered in
that state; in 1899, the percentage climbed to fifty-five percent.125 In that same
year, in a conscious attempt to challenge New Jersey’s dominance, Delaware
enacted its General Corporation Laws.126 To a large extent, Delaware’s

121.
122.

123.

124.

125.
126.

Massachusetts is credited as the first state to recognize conservation easements. See Jean
Hocker, Foreword to PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 6, at xvii.
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821) (holding that “the navigable rivers, where the tide
ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the
land under the water, for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing,
fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water and its products” are held in public
trust for the benefit of the residents of New Jersey).
Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 161 N.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Minn. 1968)
(holding that a joint tenancy may be terminated and transformed into a tenancy in common
by a unilateral conveyance to oneself); see also Helmholz, supra note 57, at 10 (stating that
Hendrickson was the first case to recognize this option).
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (declaring an easement for the public
over Oregon’s privately owned dried sand beaches based on the doctrine of custom); Steven
W. Bender, Castles in the Sand: Balancing Public Custom and Private Ownership Interests on
Oregon’s Beaches, 77 OR. L. REV. 913, 913-14 (1998) (“Nationally, Oregon is credited with,
and sometimes criticized for, resuscitating the custom doctrine as applied to beach rights.”).
Credit for being the first state to invoke the custom doctrine to declare rights in the public
should arguably go to Hawaii. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968) (locating seaward
boundaries at the upper reaches of the wash of waves on grounds of Hawaiian custom).
See RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 12-13 (1937).
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 116, at 727 n.171 (describing how Delaware challenged New
Jersey).
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legislation was a copy of New Jersey’s corporate law,127 but the former was
subsequently complemented by a marketing campaign designed to promote
Delaware’s reputation as an appealing locale for incorporation.128 Furthermore,
over time, the Delaware legislature updated its General Corporate Laws to
remain attractive to corporations. The story of Delaware illustrates that
competition among states is in fact possible and that the target audience, in this
case corporations, responds to innovative approaches by states.
B. The Tiebout Hypothesis
A second reference point for our analysis is the Tiebout hypothesis.129 In a
pathbreaking article, Charles Tiebout set out to challenge the view that public
goods may not be provided efficiently due to the absence of an effective
mechanism for the public to reveal its preferences.130 Tiebout commenced his
analysis by pointing to an important difference between central and local
government with respect to the provision of public goods.131 He observed that
at the central (or federal) level, the preferences of the citizens are a given, and
the government must adjust to them.132 At the local level, however, localities
can compete to attract residents by varying their revenue and expenditure
patterns, and residents can then choose among these localities by moving to the
one that best fits their preferences (“voting with their feet”).133 As Tiebout
noted, the greater the number of communities and the larger the variance
between them, the closer individuals will come to satisfying their
preferences.134 This analysis led Tiebout to conclude that under certain
conditions, it is possible to achieve efficient provision of local public goods.135
127.

128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1934) (“[I]t is common knowledge
that the general act of this state adopted in 1899 was modeled after the then existing New
Jersey act.”).
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 116, at 727 n.171 (noting that “[t]he adoption of
[Delaware’s] new code was followed by vigorous marketing efforts”).
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
This view was associated with the economists Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson. See
Richard Abel Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q.J. ECON. 213
(1939); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387,
388-89 (1954).
Tiebout, supra note 129, at 418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420. Tiebout’s specific assumptions were that: (1) Each consumer-voter is fully mobile
and selects the community that best satisfies his preferences for public goods; (2) consumervoters have full knowledge of differences; (3) there are a large number of communities; (4)
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Tiebout’s analysis has become a classic in legal scholarship. His basic
insight was subsequently applied to myriad legal fields, ranging from
environmental law136 to banking137 to antitrust.138 At least to some extent, the
Tiebout hypothesis has found support in empirical studies.139 These studies
suggest that migration patterns between city and suburbs are significantly
affected by tax levels and investment in education.140
What are the implications of the Tiebout hypothesis for competition over
property forms? In the United States, property law is a local public good that
fits Tiebout’s framework of analysis.141 In addressing this question, then, it is
necessary to take account of two unique characteristics of property law as a

136.

137.

138.
139.

140.

141.

there are no restrictions due to employment opportunities; (5) public services exhibit no
economies or diseconomies between communities; (6) each community has an optimal
community size (number of residents for which a bundle of services can be produced at the
lowest cost); and (7) communities seek to maintain optimal community size. Id. at 419.
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992)
(arguing that competition among states over environmental regulation will not lead to a race
to the bottom). Revesz’s article was a response to two articles by Richard Stewart, both
positing that competition among states over environmental regulation will lead to a race to
the bottom. Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62
IOWA L. REV. 713, 747 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism
in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977).
See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1977) (suggesting that federal and state regulators compete over bank
charters). But see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 693-707 (1988) (employing public choice theory to
argue that the competition between federal and state regulators identified by Scott does not
exist, and recommending devolution to the state level in order to create competition).
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 23-25
(1983).
E.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 524 (1991) (“Many studies have shown that
middle-class migration between the city and the suburbs is significantly affected by the
disparity . . . between city and suburban spending for education.”); Georgette C.
Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 615
(1997) (“Empirical data, in fact, bear out the Tiebout hypothesis.”).
See William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s
Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 887
(2004); Poindexter, supra note 139, at 615. However, a recent empirical study by Paul Rhode
and Koleman Strumpf suggests that long-run trends in geographic sorting are inconsistent
with the Tiebout hypothesis. Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the
Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648
(2003).
See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1092-97 (1999) (characterizing law as a public good).
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subject of state competition. First, the fact that property forms are produced on
the state level, not the local level, dramatically increases the relocation costs
individuals must incur to change property regimes. By contrast to competition
over education, which requires relatively modest moves from the city to the
suburbs or from one suburb to another, competition over property forms
entails significant changes in lifestyle. Second, by contrast to natural amenities,
the law may be transported to other places. That is, it is not necessary for
individuals to live in a particular place in order to enjoy a legal regime that
exists there; laws may, in principle, be imported by people in other locales.
Together, these factors suggest that while Tiebout competition is probably less
robust today for property law than for local amenities, increasing the
portability of state property law should make it quite amenable to Tiebout
competition.
C. Politics and the Production of Property Law
As should be evident by now, while there is competition in the market for
the production of property law, this market is quite different from the ordinary
one for consumer goods. Property laws are, for the most part, produced by a
political process. Consumers cannot simply contract with suppliers for the
production and delivery of their desired goods or make purchases from
retailers on an open, competitive market. The purchase price of property law is
indirect, and is incurred when one casts votes, contributes to political
campaigns, or enters into a jurisdiction and exposes oneself to local taxes. The
supply side of the property law market is even more complicated. A variety of
political institutions, most importantly elected legislative bodies, produce
property laws.142 These bodies, in turn, are staffed by decisionmakers who
ideally have no direct pecuniary interest in the legislative outcome, but who
often seek to maximize ideological preferences, personal reputation, reelection
opportunities, and other political rents, sometimes at the expense of state
profits or the public welfare. The agency problem that plagues corporate law
thus expresses itself even more sharply in the political context. Finally, the
good being consumed itself bears a peculiar quality—property laws are
jurisdictional, rather than personal. Generally, one cannot purchase a property
law of individual application.

142.

98

Property law may also be produced by the courts. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying
text (describing the role of courts and legislatures in legal developments in the law of
cotenancies).
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In a recent article, Saul Levmore observed that property institutions
develop along two paths.143 The first path is presumed to be efficient, and is
governed by the forces of supply and demand, mediated by transaction-cost
economics.144 Along this path, new property rights evolve when the expected
value from their creation exceeds the expected cost.145 The second path is not
presumed to be efficient, and is dominated by interest groups engaged in
constant rent-seeking. These actors do not seek to create efficient economic
institutions, but rather to take advantage of their political influence to obtain
favorable property regimes.146 The evolution of property law is thus shaped by
two inconsistent forces and, in particular, the interplay between them.
How does federalism affect the analysis? We contend that federalism
augments the efficient forces and weakens the inefficient ones. As we already
explained, the federal structure of the United States enables interstate
competition over property forms along the lines of the Tiebout model. This
competition places constant pressure on local legislatures to design or adopt
new property regimes that are consistent with the preferences of local
residents. To be sure, local legislatures are not immune from external interestgroup pressure. Nonlocal interest groups can influence local decisionmaking
through campaign contributions and other forms of lobbying. However, as
Madison noted, to the extent that these interest groups desire to establish
uniform national rules, federalism stands as an obstacle.147 When lawmaking is
done on the state level, as is the case with property, attempts by interest groups
to achieve nationwide uniformity are by and large doomed.148 Imagine, for

143.

144.

145.
146.

147.

148.

Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003)
[hereinafter Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path]; see also Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002).
Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 143, at 182 (“[T]he conventional and optimistic
story is that the emergence of property rights in personal and real property has been a story
of evolutionary success.”).
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path, supra note 143, at 182 (“There is room, however, for an
alternative and more skeptical depiction of the evolution of these property rights. This story
is one of interest groups, tribute, and grave market imperfections.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 62 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1979) (arguing
that the federal system renders factions “unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression” because the “influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other
States”).
This may create a problem if property regimes are characterized by network effects. A
network externality exists when the utility that a given user derives from a good depends
upon the number of other users who are in the same network. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424,
424 (1985).
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example, that an interest group seeks to reintroduce the fee tail into all U.S.
jurisdictions. If property law were produced by a central legislature, a massive
lobbying campaign could yield the desired result. When the production of
property law is controlled by the states, however, the lobbyists must target
each state legislature, and more critically, every state has veto power over the
proposed changes. Thus, federalism dilutes the influence of out-of-state
interest groups and diminishes their ability to pass inefficient legislation for the
whole country.
Naturally, interest groups will often agree to settle for less than sweeping
national changes. Changing the law in certain states may satisfy their goals.
Yet, even in these cases, enhancing federalism provides a check on the ability of
interest groups to pass inefficient legislation. The existence of more efficient
property regimes in other states, and the ability of consumers to readily take
advantage of such regimes, would create a constant pressure on states with less
efficient ones to modify their laws. In the face of these competitive pressures,
interest groups would have to expend more resources to maintain the
inefficient regimes they helped pass. The higher cost of maintaining inefficient
regimes may, in turn, deter interest group lobbyists from promoting the
inefficient legislation in the first place.
In the property context, as in others, interest groups opposing some kinds
of revolutionary change will find themselves strengthened, rather than
weakened, by federalism. For example, if property forms can be freely taken
advantage of in every jurisdiction, interest groups will be able to defeat
complete abolition of a property form by winning in a single jurisdiction.149 As
we will discuss later, this necessitates limiting our proposal in order to prevent
federalism from leading to a race to the bottom in property law.150
D. Exit, Voice, and Federalism
A related way of examining the issue of local provision of law and its
interplay with politics is through the prism of Albert Hirschman’s distinction
between the control mechanisms of “exit” and “voice.”151 Hirschman suggested
that the market could exercise quality control over some types of goods, not
only through consumers’ exercise of the option to exit and purchase a
competing good, but also by utilizing consumers’ voice to appeal for superior
products. Hirschman’s perspective may be translated into terms we have
149.
150.
151.
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Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (arguing against viewing
protection of the status quo as “neutral” among participants in the political arena).
See infra Section III.B.
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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discussed thus far. Control by exit parallels Tiebout’s competitive mechanism
in which consumers obtain the preferred package of public goods by “voting
with their feet.” Control by voice, in turn, corresponds to political control of
public goods through effective democratic mechanisms. Naturally, proponents
of an interest group theory of politics tend to be skeptical about the
effectiveness of control through voice.
Federal systems are designed to enhance both exit and voice options. The
greater diversity of local property schemes allows owners to exit jurisdictions
with undesirable property schemes in favor of states with more favorable ones.
The effective limitation of interest groups to those jurisdictions in which they
are strongest also decreases their ability to compete with rank-and-file property
owners in other jurisdictions. In the context of contractual choice-of-law
clauses, Larry Ribstein has argued that the ability to exit the jurisdiction of
local law through choice-of-law clauses drives lawmakers to produce efficient
laws.152
William Fischel has also argued that local political control enhances
property owners’ voice at the expense of other interest groups. According to
Fischel’s “homevoter hypothesis,” homeowners dominate local politics
because, as a group, homeowners’ most valuable asset is generally their homes,
and that asset’s value is dramatically affected by local political decisions. Fischel
notes that the local decisions that homeowners seek to affect are much broader
than traditional property law, and include such related issues as property taxes,
zoning, and educational funding. Nevertheless, the concentration of political
power in the hands of homeowners seeking to maximize the value of their
primary assets leads to an enhanced political voice for rank-and-file property
owners at lower levels of government.153
iii. enhancing choice in property
In this Part, we move from the descriptive to the normative. Having
explained how federalism shapes the American property system, and the
attendant virtues of federalism, we now argue for a further expansion of state
competition and individual choice in property law. Specifically, we propose a
system that would allow owners to opt into certain out-of-state property
regimes in exchange for the payment of a modest fee. Today, in order to enjoy
an out-of-state property form, property owners typically must change their
residence. Our proposal obviates the need to relocate, under certain

152.
153.

See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law,
37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003).
FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 6.
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circumstances, by allowing property owners to avail themselves of the national
menu of property forms.
In our proposed world, a couple married in Massachusetts could agree to
hold property under California’s community-property regime. As under
current law, property forms could not thereafter be altered at will, but the
creators of any given property estate would be able to choose among legal
options from outside state lines in setting up the new estate. Thus, an
individual creating a new property right in any part of the United States would
be able to choose from the full list of forms available in all states.
In the next Section, we lay out our proposal in greater detail. In the Section
following, we address potential objections and explore some of the
informational and prudential boundaries of our proposed scheme.
A. A Proposal for Choice in Property
Policymakers have failed so far to take full advantage of the expanded menu
of property forms generated by the American federal system. At present,
residents of a certain state who wish to adopt a property form of another state
must relocate, as predicted by the Tiebout hypothesis, to the state in which
their desired form is offered. There is no inherent reason, however, why this
should be so. In sum, relocation costs are a distortion of the market for
property forms that may lead property owners to choose suboptimally where
such costs overwhelm the potential benefits of choosing a foreign state’s form.
A helpful way to analyze the problem is by viewing property forms as an
item on the market. In this view, when one chooses which property form to
attach to a given asset, one chooses from the available options on the market
just as one might select a television from an electronics store. To make this
choice, the consumer evaluates the expected utility of the purchased asset and
compares it to the market price. The state’s list of property forms, under the
current property regime, is analogous to the list of domestically produced
televisions, and out-of-state property forms are like imported televisions. The
current requirement that one relocate in order to “purchase” out-of-state
property forms acts like a tariff or an import tax. It discourages consumers
from purchasing potentially superior out-of-state forms, thereby favoring suboptimal local forms.154
154.
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Granted, the importation analogy is not precise in all respects. Today, one cannot order up
an out-of-state property form at will and import it. Sometimes, as with community
property, the property owner must migrate temporarily to the other state in order to
impress a new property regime upon her ownership of an asset. Other times, the migration
must be permanent in order to benefit from domiciliary situs rules governing property
forms. Still, viewing relocation as a tax on out-of-state forms remains a useful way of
examining the issue.
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The higher cost of attaching out-of-state property forms to assets forces
many owners to forego certain out-of-state forms they would have chosen in a
perfectly competitive property-forms market, making them settle for an
inferior in-state form. Thus, extending our analogy, our proposal acts as a free
trade regime under which tariffs are eradicated and consumers can choose from
among foreign and domestic products. Specifically, we seek to eliminate the
need for relocation—whether temporary or permanent—in order to adopt outof-state property forms. Or, put differently, we call for the establishment of a
national menu of property forms available to all citizens.
Under our proposed regime, whenever a new property right is created or
acquired, the parties may define the property right by choosing from the full
menu of options available throughout the country. Thus, for example, when a
landowner in Massachusetts transfers realty to her children in anticipation of
her death, she may select not only from the available real property estate forms
in Massachusetts, but also from those of New York, California, and all the
other states of the Union. Naturally, in order to provide notice to interested
third parties, the landowner would have to make an explicit indication in the
in-state registry of the type of estate chosen.
Additionally, the estate would have to be registered in the state from which
the property form was taken. States must have some sort of incentive to offer
innovative products and services, and property law is no exception. States that
create and offer desirable property forms must stand to gain from their
innovations. Indeed, only if states can collect the full value derived from
innovative property forms—a measure that reflects the value for both in-state
and out-of-state residents—will they have an optimal incentive to develop new
property forms.
Generally, states’ rewards come in the form of tax revenue. When residents
vote with their feet and move to an area with superior public services and
goods, they expose themselves to the full panoply of local taxes. Tiebout’s
model predicts that local governments will adjust their taxes and services in
order to reach the lowest average cost of providing the desired package of
public goods. The problem is that relocation costs often prevent individuals
from voting with their feet. Many property owners who wish to adopt an outof-state property form ultimately refrain from doing so due to the high
relocation costs, thereby diminishing the states’ incentive to come up with
innovative property forms. Put differently, the high relocation costs inhibit
competition both on the demand side and the supply side. Worse yet,
relocation costs are a social deadweight loss; they impose a cost on the
relocating owner without creating offsetting benefits for anyone else.155
155.

Tiebout also noted the adverse effects of relocation costs on the market for local public
services. See Tiebout, supra note 129, at 421-22.
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To overcome the problem of high relocation costs we turn once again to the
field of corporate law. There, the problem was avoided by allowing firms to
incorporate in a state of their choice in exchange for the payment of an
incorporation fee and the firm’s continued exposure to the incorporating state’s
taxes and legal system. This option already provides some choice to owners of
personal property who wish to take advantage of foreign property law. As we
note later, the property law of chattel is determined by the owner’s domicile.
An owner of chattel therefore may impose a foreign property regime on her
personalty by creating a foreign corporation or trust and transferring the
property to that entity.156
However, our proposal goes beyond the option of fictional domiciliary
change by directly permitting property registration in other jurisdictions, as
with corporations. In effect, incorporation is a form of registration that permits
the state to enjoy enhanced revenues as a result of superior legal forms. The
broader lesson to be drawn is that registration can serve as the opening for
states to enhance local revenues, and thereby profit from the superiority of the
legal forms they provide. Registration, in other words, can substitute for
relocation. Thus, we propose that rather than relocating, a property owner
should be able to register asset X in any state of her choice, and by so doing
attach the menu of property forms available under the law of that state to asset
X. In exchange, the property owner will have to pay a one-time registration fee
and, possibly, perennial property taxes. To be sure, because the asset will still
be physically located in its original jurisdiction, this jurisdiction should also be
able to impose property taxes—after all, the local jurisdiction will still have to
provide services connected with the property.157
Our proposed registration system evokes yet another analogy: choice-oflaw and forum provisions in contracts. As we noted earlier, parties often use
choice-of-law clauses in contracts to take advantage of out-of-state legal
provisions. There are several important differences to note, however. First,
contract law is not subject to the dynamic of Tiebout competition. States do
not benefit from the fact that out-of-state parties select their law in choice-oflaw clauses. Consequently, states have no incentive to craft contract laws that

156.

157.
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Cf. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 9, at 1065-74 (discussing the use of such fictional
property relocation in the context of trust law competition, and noting that jurisdictional
competition can undermine states’ policies).
We do not confine ourselves to any particular mechanism of implementing the registration
system. One possibility is national legislation, allowing the states to adopt a uniform
reciprocal system. Another might be state entrepreneurship, in which one state offers a
registry, and leaves it to property owners to litigate or battle for recognition in other states.
Irrespective of how a registry system arose, the efficiency of property registration would
doubtless become one of the goods involved in property-form competition.
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meet the needs of out-of-state parties.158 Out-of-state parties simply free-ride
on the state’s contract law. Our proposal, by contrast, is likely to improve the
quality of the legislating state’s substantive law—a phenomenon that is
unlikely to occur with respect to contract law. Second, contracts are binding
only on the contracting parties; they do not affect third parties. Property and
corporate law, by contrast, affect many third parties. As Merrill and Smith
correctly observed, property rights are in rem rights availing against the rest of
the world, and they therefore impose informational and other costs on the
public. As a result it is more important to govern the potential negative
externalities imposed by property forms by extracting a price from the
beneficiary of a property form.159
B. The Limits of Choice in Property
Having sketched out the basics of our proposal for expanding the choice of
forms available to property owners, we now turn to potential objections to our
scheme. We deal in turn with four potential challenges: the greater
informational burdens imposed by relaxation of the numerus clausus principle;
the use of out-of-state property forms to limit others’ rights, such as by
reducing the exposure of property to adverse possession; the linkage between
legal status, such as marital status, and the right to exploit property forms; and
the potential tension between moral sensibilities and property forms. Each of
these challenges demands that we more precisely tailor our federal property
regime.
1. Information Costs
As we have noted, Merrill and Smith found the importance of the principle
of numerus clausus in the imperative to convey information about property
rights. According to Merrill and Smith, because property law creates rights in
rem that are good against an indefinitely large group of people who will never
bargain over the content of the rights, it is particularly important for the law to
limit the opportunities for confusion about the rights’ content. Limiting the list
158.

Indeed, the related forum-selection clauses impose an uncompensated cost on the forum
state. As Alex Stein recently noted, contracts create an externality in that they may give rise
to future litigation, and the court system is subsidized by the public. See Alex Stein, An Essay
on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special Reference to Contract Cases, 48
U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 341-44 (1998).

159.

This last point also explains, once again, why choice-of-law clauses in contract law are an
imperfect substitute for free choice of property forms. The contract-only clauses bind the
parties to the contract, but no others. Thus, even though contract law already recognizes the
validity of choice-of-law clauses, there should still be a market for selecting property forms.
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of property forms, wrote Merrill and Smith, accomplishes this goal by making
third parties responsible only for determining which of the permitted property
forms applies to a given object, rather than guessing which of an infinite
number of bargains was struck, as is the case in the law of contract.160
We believe that the informative importance of the numerus clausus rule can
be overstated. First, even under the current system third parties cannot assume,
without checking, that out-of-state forms do not apply to an asset. Property
owners can and do move about the United States. Additionally, property
transactions may be carried out by parties across state lines. As a consequence,
states already must take account of foreign property rules in choice-of-law
doctrines. For instance, one who purchases chattel from a person who recently
moved into the area must take into account the possibility that the chattel is
held in a property form unfamiliar in the jurisdiction where the sale is taking
place.
It is a longstanding choice-of-law rule that conflicts involving real estate are
governed by the law of the situs in which the realty is located.161 Originating in
England,162 this rule has been adopted by U.S. courts, and has been
consistently applied in real estate cases. The courts’ continued adherence to the
lex situs rule has attracted the ire of academic commentators.163 Critics of the
rule argued that lex situs leads to the same inequitable results that prompted the
abolition of other territorial rules from modern conflicts law and their
replacement with a due process “minimum contacts” standard.164 Yet, the lex
situs rule has withstood the attacks and continues to control disputes over real
estate.
By contrast, disputes involving personal property are controlled by the law
of the owner’s domicile.165 This rule implies that owners can move personalty
from one state to another and retain the property regime of their domicile.
Therefore, insofar as personalty is concerned, third parties cannot assume that

160.

161.
162.

163.

164.
165.

106

See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 8 (“When property rights are created, third parties
must expend time and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid
violating them and to acquire them from present holders.”).
See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19.1, at 743 (2d ed. 1992).
Moffatt Hancock, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property
Litigation: The Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1302-05 (1966)
(describing the evolution of the lex situs rule in England).
See, e.g., MOFFATT HANCOCK, STUDIES IN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW: TORTS, INSURANCE,
LAND TITLES 300-09 (1984) (criticizing the mechanical application of lex situs); Alden, supra
note 27, at 586-87 (referring to decisions under the lex situs rule as “unjust” and calling for
the abolition of the rule).
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
See HANCOCK, supra note 163, at 232.
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the law of the situs applies. Rather, they must determine the owner’s domicile
and ascertain the law of that jurisdiction.
A further complication arises in cases involving marital property. As a
general rule, when a married couple changes its domicile from a communityproperty state to a common law state, the community property, and the
property acquired with community funds, will remain as such.166 For example,
if a couple from Washington (a community-property state) migrates to
Pennsylvania (a common law state), the assets of the couple may be subject to a
community-property regime even in Pennsylvania. Indeed, the relocation of
couples from community-property to non-community-property states may
result in new forms of hybrid property where a single item is partially ruled by
a community-property regime, and partially not.167 Hence, in cases involving
marital property, third parties must not only inquire about the domicile of the
couple, but also about their domicile at the time an asset was acquired.168
The legal intricacy of interstate marital property claims and transactions is
likely to multiply in coming years as a result of the controversy over
recognition of same-sex marriages. As noted earlier, Vermont and
Massachusetts each recognize some form of same-sex union, but a substantial
majority of states purport to deny full faith and credit to such unions.169 Given
the political potency of the issue, and the intricacy of the attendant
constitutional questions, the status of same-sex unions seems unlikely to be
resolved in the near future. One imagines that it will not be long before
complicated property cases—perhaps adopting old anti-miscegenation rules—

166.

167.

168.

169.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (1971). Comment (a) to § 259
notes: “Considerations of fairness and convenience require that the spouses’ marital
property interests . . . are not affected by a change of domicil to another state by one or both
of the spouses.” Comment (b) adds: “When a chattel or document is taken into a second
state and is there exchanged for some other movable or immovable, the spouses acquire the
same interests therein as they had in the original chattel or document.”
See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 558 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1990) (holding that California pension
rights are apportioned and governed by the California community-property regime for the
time period of the couple’s domicile in California); see also REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 3, at
599-601.
Further complications may be introduced by the local law on distribution of property upon
dissolution of the marriage. As we have noted elsewhere, issues of distribution of “marital
property” are not necessarily questions of property law. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 42,
at 611-12. However, anticipated rules of distribution certainly confound the communityproperty equation. See generally Merrie Chappell, Comment, A Uniform Resolution to the
Problem a Migrating Spouse Encounters at Divorce and Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 993 (1992).
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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arise in which courts will have to fashion new conflict-of-laws rules to deal
with incompatible laws of marital status.170
Second, many forms of property rights may be registered—indeed, many
property rights are protected only if the owner registers the rights.171 Once a
right is registered, there is no need for guesswork at all about the nature of
property protection that attaches to a given object, and the numerus clausus rule
is thus of limited utility.172
Third, the closed menu conveys very little information. For instance, a
buyer of realty cannot know, on the basis of the numerus clausus rule, whether a
seller of a given house is in possession of a life estate, a defeasible fee, or a fee
simple absolute. Indeed, the buyer cannot even know whether the seller
possesses any legal rights at all. The numerus clausus rule merely ensures that if
the seller has legal rights, they will be in one of the recognized forms of estate.
The numerus clausus rule thus transfers very little operative information.
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that there is an informational cost to
permitting greater use of out-of-state property forms. We therefore suggest
that states require registration of out-of-state property forms as a prerequisite
for taking advantage of such forms. While there will be some costs involved in
learning foreign law, the registry should offer greater clarity, significantly
reducing the information costs of permitting increased choice. Additionally, as
scholars have noted in the context of conflict of laws, parties that have to bear
litigation costs will choose their law in a manner that reduces the costs of
understanding and implementing foreign law.173
2. Defensive and Offensive Uses of Property Choice
To ensure that competition among states over property forms does indeed
lead to a race to the top, it is necessary to distinguish between defensive and
offensive uses. Specifically, we posit that the freedom of property owners to
170.

171.

172.

173.
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See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married when We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033; Alan Reed, Essential Validity of
Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law
Rules, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 387, 414-44 (2000); see also infra note 191.
Patents are an obvious example. Inventors must file their patent application for review by
the Patent and Trademark Office and, if the patent is approved, it gets registered. As for
copyrights, although registration is no longer a prerequisite for protection, it is a
precondition for bringing an infringement suit. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000).
But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10 (arguing that the restriction on the creation of
new property rights by private actors serves not to standardize rights, but rather to facilitate
verification of the ownership of rights offered for conveyance).
See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000).
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import out-of-state forms should be restricted to defensive uses, and that the
importation of offensive forms should not be permitted.
The line between defensive and offensive uses is not easily drawn.
Offensive uses are those that involve nonconsensual erosion of the property
rights of other owners. Offensive uses thus include doctrines such as nuisance
and adverse possession. Assume that A, a property owner from New York who
plans to acquire title to B’s property by adversely possessing it, wishes to take
advantage of the shorter adverse possession period that exists in California.
Could she import the California rules of adverse possession and attach them to
B’s property? The answer is no. Adverse possession is an offensive use, or
form, and thus out-of-state owners may not import it. Similarly, property
owners should not be able to take advantage of other states’ lax nuisance rules
in order to diminish the value of neighboring properties.
Defensive uses are different, in that they do not involve a nonconsensual
erosion of other property owners’ rights. Consider, for example, the case of
conservation easements. Assume that E, an avid environmentalist, wishes to
create a conservation easement in a state that does not recognize this property
form. Can E import the form? The answer, under our proposed regime, is yes.
By creating a conservation easement, E does not adversely affect the rights of
third parties. Of course, the creation of the easement has implications for E.
Her decision to restrict future development may lower the price she will receive
if she sells the property. The conservation easement may also improve the value
of neighbors’ properties, or grant third parties new rights to enforce the
easement. But the new easement cannot in any way diminish the rights of
other property owners.
What about more standard two-party easements? They too should fall
under the category of defensive uses. If C and D voluntarily enter into an
affirmative easement appurtenant that is not recognized by their own state but
exists in other states, nothing should bar them from doing so.174 In this case,
because the easement was created consensually, there is no fear that it will
imperil the rights of the servient estate owner. By contrast to the nuisance
example, the voluntary nature of the easement ensures against usurpation of
third parties’ property rights. Of course, once the easement has been
consummated, it will affect subsequent buyers and sellers of the lots. However,
so long as these buyers and sellers are in full possession of the relevant
information about the easement, the efficacy of the bargain will guide their
actions. Because easements require registration to be binding on third parties,
such parties should be able to learn of the easements at a very low cost.

174.

As we noted above in Section I.B, states differ on the kinds of duties and benefits that may
be solemnized in an easement.
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By the same token, even under our system, the rules of acquiring property
that do not involve mutual consent should be those of the local state. Thus, one
cannot use another state’s law to exercise finder’s rights or to prevent others
from using the local law of adverse possession. In other words, nonconsensual
acquisition of property should be strictly governed by local state law. To allow
claimants under foreign acquisition rules—as distinct from locally recognized
owners—to select such out-of-state rules unilaterally would increase conflicts
over property and foment litigation. Indeed, attempts to import foreign
acquisition rules should be viewed as offensive tactics of the sort our
framework rejects. Only after property has been acquired can its owner decide
which form to attach to it. The initial recognition of property rights in
nonconsensual transactions should be left to local law.
We illustrate some examples of defensive and offensive uses of property
rules in the table below:
Table 1.

offensive and defensive property rules
sample offensive uses

sample defensive uses

Adverse possession

Tenancies (with consent of cotenants)

Nuisance

Trusts (with consent of beneficiaries and
trustee)

Easements (without consent of
burdened party)

Easements (with consent of benefited and
burdened party)

Finder’s Rights (without consent of
original owner)

Leaseholds (with consent of lessor and
lessee)

3. Status
Closely related to the issue of federalism in property forms is the subject of
status. Status issues related to property may arise in two ways. First, state law
may determine the status of interpersonal relationships in a way that
determines whether persons (real or artificial) or partnerships may hold
property. For instance, some forms of property—such as tenancies by the
entirety and community property—are available only to married couples. Yet
state law is not uniform on the question of which couples are entitled to be
married. Massachusetts, for instance, recently recognized the rights of same-
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sex couples to marry.175 Most states, however, do not recognize the married
status of such couples. By the same token, all states recognize the rights of
corporations, as artificial persons, to own property, but states differ on the
qualifications for incorporation.176
Second, state law governs the question of whether many objects such as
fetal tissue177 or human organs178 may be the subject of claims under property
law.179
For the most part, the U.S. Constitution already dictates that the principle
of choice should govern. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states must
give full faith and credit to all public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
other states.180 As a consequence, states generally are unable to question a
status granted in another state, and they may not refuse to respect property
rights stemming from that status.181 This result is in accord with the needs of
the federal system backed by our proposal. It should be noted, however, that
the Clause also empowers Congress to determine the effect of public acts and
records in other states. The extent of this power is not certain but, at least in

175.

176.
177.
178.

179.
180.

181.

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (“Limiting the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the
basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law protected by the Massachusetts
Constitution.”). Massachusetts was not the first state to recognize same-sex marriage. That
distinction is reserved for Hawaii. In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), a plurality of
the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated the Hawaii Constitution’s equal protection clause and thus should be subject to
strict scrutiny. The court remanded the case to allow the state to show that the prohibition
was narrowly tailored and promoted a compelling state interest. On remand, the circuit
court held that the state had failed to meet its burden, effectively legalizing same-sex
marriage. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
Hawaii subsequently amended its constitution to ban same-sex marriage. HAW. CONST. art.
1, § 5 (amended 1996).
See, e.g., Cyril Moscow, Michigan or Delaware Incorporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1897 (1996).
See Nancy E. Field, Note, Evolving Conceptualizations of Property: A Proposal To DeCommercialize the Value of Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE L.J. 169 (1989).
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988) (denying
a property right under California law in spleen cells removed from a patient’s body). See
generally Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1996).
Federal law governs the susceptibility of some items to property rights. The prominent
example is the property status of inventions, expressions, and marks. See supra note 1.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
But see Habib A. Balian, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to Marital
Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1995) (noting limits on comity with regard to
marriages in violation of a state’s public policy).
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the above-mentioned case of DOMA,182 Congress has claimed the right to
abolish altogether the requirement that states recognize the validity of acts
respecting a same-sex relationship “that is treated as a marriage” or rights and
claims “arising from such [a] relationship.”183 As previously noted, scholars
dispute the Act’s validity,184 and this conflict is almost certain to be resolved
ultimately by the Supreme Court.
Quite aside from DOMA and related acts, a handful of states have retained
some version of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, which forbids
nonresidents from utilizing temporary entry into a state to take advantage of
different state rules regarding marriage.185 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act abolished the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,186 and most states followed
suit. Among the states retaining a version of the Evasion Act are Illinois,187
Massachusetts,188 and Mississippi.189
The Evasion Laws are a statutory embodiment of the “public policy”
exception to the requirement of full faith and credit. The exception—a
principle that emerged from conflict-of-laws doctrine—permits states to refuse
to recognize the validity of foreign states’ acts where such recognition would
“involve an improper interference with important interests of the sister
State.”190 The public policy exception thus allows states to reject foreign acts
that are considered incompatible with domestic law for reasons of public

182.
183.
184.
185.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
Enacted in 1912, the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act sought to “codify the rule nullifying
out-of-state marriages by domiciliaries whose marriage would be prohibited within the
domicile.” See Koppelman, supra note 78, at 944. While the statute failed to achieve broad
adoption, and was withdrawn in 1943, about fourteen states still have some form of the
statute. Id. at 944 & n.73.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 175 (1998).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (1993 & Supp. 2005).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 1998); see also supra note 16.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (2004).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971); see also supra note 80.

BELL PARCH OCT 19 NO HEADER

11/1/2005 5:12:48 PM

of property and federalism

policy.191 While it is well-grounded in case law, important questions have been
raised about the public policy exception’s constitutionality.192
The logic of our position dictates that an out-of-state status that affects
property rights should be available on the same terms as out-of-state property
rights themselves. In other words, access to out-of-state statuses should not be
limited, subject to the exceptions outlined in this Section.193
4. Morality and Property
Property has an obvious moral dimension. The infamous example of
human slavery in the United States amply demonstrates that there may be
moral reasons for abolishing some previously recognized forms of property.
In theory, our proposal could make it possible for one state to impose
immoral property forms on other states. This concern finds support in the
infamous case of Dred Scott.194 There, the Supreme Court ruled that
congressional acts making certain federal territories slave-free were
unconstitutional because they deprived slave masters of their “property” in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.195 In formulating
a proposal that would allow the property regime of a single state to extend
beyond its borders, the lessons of the past should not be forgotten.
A simple and ready way to assuage this fear is to let the federal government
retain its residual power to intervene in “the market for property forms”
through regulation. When the federal government elects to intervene for moral
reasons it can either do so by excluding certain assets from appropriation or by
prohibiting certain property forms in specific assets. Intervention of the former
type may be employed if a state attempts to create property rights in other
human beings. Regulation to outlaw such attempts is consistent with the

191.

192.
193.
194.
195.

For discussions of the public policy exception in the context of same-sex marriage, see F.H.
Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561;
Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It
Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996); L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choiceof-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will States Enforce the Public Policy
Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 43-44 (1998); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage
and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996);
Koppelman, supra note 78; and Sack, supra note 80.
See Kramer, supra note 80.
A similar conclusion was reached by Larry Ribstein. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Standard Form
Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 309 (2005).
Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Id. at 450-51.
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Thirteenth Amendment and is fully justified in our opinion.196 Intervention of
the latter type may be appropriate to regulate property regimes in human
organs or tissues. For example, the federal government may decide for moral
reasons that a person may donate her organs but not sell them.197 Alternatively,
one might rely upon the public policy doctrine from the field of conflict of laws
to reject perceived immoral forms at the state level. Under this doctrine, states
would reject a property form (or status) that was so contrary to the moral
standards of the state as to be an intolerable interference with the state’s
sovereignty.198
Fortunately, it is highly unlikely that any state in the Union would try to
reintroduce slavery. However, there may still be instances where moral
arguments should trump property rights, such that it would be wrong to force
interstate recognition of immoral property forms. Indeed, claims have been
made regarding the moral propriety of recognizing property rights in
animals,199 fetal tissue or organs,200 and rights stemming from marital
status.201

196.

197.

198.
199.

200.

201.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
(arguing that markets have inherent limitations and that certain entitlements must, for
moral reasons, remain outside the ken of market transactions).
See supra Subsection III.B.3.
See, e.g., STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000) (contending that certain species of primates should be considered persons and given
basic human rights).
See, e.g., Gregory Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulation of Human
Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (1993) (arguing in favor of the
moral propriety of using fetal tissue).
See, e.g., Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 165,
172 (1998) (“Laws establishing slavery and denying property rights to married women could
not be justified by traditional moral norms under this standard, because these laws
facilitated the ability of whites and men to dominate slaves and women in personal
relationships and to exploit their labor and sexuality.”); see also Michael Paulson, Vatican
Warns on Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a Vatican
declaration that same-sex marriages “go against natural moral law”). Congressman Henry
Hyde, while arguing in favor of DOMA, stated that whether society should recognize samesex marriage “is a moral issue” and that “[p]eople don’t think that the traditional marriage
ought to be demeaned or trivialized by same-sex unions.” SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND
CON 225 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
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of property and federalism

conclusion
The federal character of American property law renders it a fertile ground
for experimentation with new and exciting property regimes. The positive
project of this Essay is to show how state production of property law enhances
diversity in property forms and thereby enables more individuals to satisfy
their property preferences. The normative project of this Essay is to suggest a
mechanism that would further expand the menu of available property forms.
Recognizing that relocation costs can hobble the beneficial effects of state
competition over property forms, the Essay proposes that property owners be
permitted to adopt out-of-state property forms in exchange for the payment of
a registration fee. Our proposal creates not only more choices for property
owners, but also a meaningful incentive for states to invest in more innovative
property regimes. In the absence of a dominant state, like Delaware in the
corporate context, competition in the field of property along the lines of our
proposal has the potential to revitalize this venerable, yet antiquated, field.
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